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Abstract
This article sets out to contribute to the special issue devo-
ted to multi-disciplinary legal research by discussing first the
limits of purely doctrinal legal research in relation to a par-
ticular topic and second the relevant considerations in devis-
ing research that (inter alia) draws on non-legal, auxiliary
disciplines to ‘fill in’ and guide the legal framework. The
topic concerned is the (analysis of the) fundamental rights
of minorities.
The article starts with a long account of the flaws in the cur-
rent legal analysis of the European Court of Human Rights
regarding minorities’ rights, particularly the reduction in its
analysis and the related failure to properly identify and
weigh all relevant interests and variables. This ‘prelude’ pro-
vides crucial insights in the causes of the flaws in the Court’s
jurisprudence: lack of knowledge (about the relevant inter-
ests and variables) and concerns with the Court’s political
legitimacy.
The article goes on to argue for the need for multi-discipli-
nary legal research to tackle the lack of knowledge: more
particularly by drawing on sociology (and related social sci-
ences) and political philosophy as auxiliary disciplines to
identify additional interests and variables for the rights anal-
ysis. The ensuing new analytical framework for the analysis
of minorities’ rights would benefit international courts (adju-
dicating on human rights) generally. To operationalise and
refine the new analytical framework, the research should
furthermore have regard to the practice of (a selection of)
international courts and national case studies.
Keywords: minorities’ fundamental rights, international
courts, European Court of Human Rights, lack of knowl-
edge, multi-disciplinary legal research
1 Introduction and Setting the
Scene
The appropriate treatment of persons belonging to eth-
nic, religious, or linguistic minorities tends to be contro-
versial in most states. As diversity in states is increasing,
* Professor of minorities and fundamental rights at the Erasmus School of
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also due to the effects of globalisation and related migra-
tion streams, the tensions concerning minorities are
expected to rise. These tensions imply challenges for
public authorities, inter alia in view of liberal democra-
cies’ commitment to respect fundamental rights, also of
persons belonging to minorities. The recurring criti-
cisms of decisions by public authorities and (interna-
tional) courts that affect fundamental rights of minori-
ties, as failing to do justice to the complexities involved
and the related multitude of relevant interests, point to
the limits of pure legal doctrine in this respect. An arti-
cle for a special issue dedicated to multi-disciplinary
(legal) research obviously focuses on the ways in which
this research method could contribute to tackling flaws
in the analysis of minorities’ rights. In other words, this
article’s central research question reads: in what way can
the findings of non-legal research be incorporated in
legal doctrinal research, so as to improve the identifica-
tion and weighing of all relevant interests for the analy-
sis of minorities’ rights.
The analysis here will focus on the importance of multi-
disciplinary legal research for the analysis of minorities’
rights, which would ideally feed into the judicial prac-
tice of international courts. Liberal democracies globally
share a commitment to fundamental rights, which
implies that they accept the need to respect these rights
when developing policies, legislation, and practice, also
in relation to minorities. When states fail in their pri-
mary responsibility to respect fundamental rights,1 sub-
sidiary protection and human rights leadership of inter-
national courts, and related guidance for states, is cru-
cial.2 The problem analysis in this article will zoom-in
on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), undoubtedly the international court
adjudicating on human rights issues par excellence in
Europe.3 Furthermore, over the years, the ECtHR has
become the international human rights court with the
1. The concept ‘courts’ includes quasi-judicial bodies.
2. J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primar-
ity in the European Convention on Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff
(2009), at 255-57; M. Kumm, ‘Democracy is Not Enough: Rights, Pro-
portionality and the Point of Judicial Review’, NYU School of Law Pub-
lic Law Research Paper No 09-10, at 3-5 (2009).
3. All member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the conven-
tion, thus accepting the Court’s ultimate jurisdiction on questions per-
taining to human rights (enshrined in the convention). CJEU’s Opinion
2/2013 may have dismissed the draft agreement on EU accession to the
ECHR; the Lisbon treaty still requires the EU to ratify the ECHR.
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most extensive and rich jurisprudence on minorities,
both in terms of range of topics and numbers of judge-
ments.4
1.1 Human Rights, Limitations, Interpretation
Principles, and Judicial Activism
It is generally accepted that the law, and certainly
human rights law, is not only determined by the text of
the legal provisions concerned, but also by the interpre-
tation of that text. Since the formulation of human
rights is open to a range of different interpretations, the
interpretation principles, or maxims adopted are often
decisive. The effective enjoyment of fundamental
rights5 is an overarching concern for international courts
monitoring the compliance of fundamental rights. In the
words of the ECtHR, the convention must be interpre-
ted in a manner which renders its rights practical and
effective, not theoretical or illusory.6 This implies that
the scope of application of rights should be interpreted
broadly, generously. Since most fundamental rights are
not absolute, their effective protection does not require
their absolute realisation. Nevertheless, limitations by
public authorities need to respect particular require-
ments.7 Indeed, the requirements that states need to
meet when they want to limit the enjoyment of rights
are of paramount importance to safeguard their effective
protection. In this respect, an interpretation maxim has
developed following which limitations need to be con-
strued restrictively.8 In line with the overarching ration-
al of human rights conventions, the protection of human
rights is the baseline, and thus limitations need to be
interpreted restrictedly.9 Consequently, when some-
thing is accepted to fall within the scope of application
of a right, states have to respect and protect this right,
4. Inter alia G. Gilbert, ‘The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, at
736-80 (2002). See also S. Akermark, ‘Limits of Pluralism-Recent Juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights with Regard to
Minorities: Does the Prohibition of Discrimination Add Anything?’,
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, at 1-24 (2002).
5. Minorities’ fundamental rights encompass both general rights (for
everyone) and minority-specific rights. Notwithstanding differences in
formulation, for both general human rights (including the prohibition of
discrimination) and minority-specific rights proportionality considera-
tions, is key. See inter alia K. Henrard, ‘Non-Discrimination and Full and
Effective Equality’, in M. Weller (ed.), Universal Minority Rights: A
Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty
Bodies, OUP (2007), at 94-5; J. Ringelheim, ‘Minority Rights in a Time
of Multiculturalism – The Evolving Scope of the Framework Convention
on the Protection of National Minorities’, Human Rights Law Review, at
114, 116, 121 (2010). The analysis in this article is focused on general
rights.
6. ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, Series A No. 32, 2 EHRR (1979-1980), at 305.
7. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press (1977), at
133, 188, 223; K. Henrard, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Margin of Appre-
ciation Doctrine of the ECtHR, in Particular about Rights to a Traditional
Way of Life and to a Healthy Environment: A Call for an Alternative
Model of International Supervision’, Yearbook on Polar Law, at 388 ff.;
D. Réaume, ‘Limitations on Constitutional Rights: The Logic of Propor-
tionality’, University of Oxford Legal Research Series No. 26/2009, at
1-2.
8. G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the ECHR, OUP (2007), at 83.
9. Inter alia N. Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights
Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence, CUP (2002),
at 184.
and they need to have very good and concrete reasons to
limit its enjoyment. The maxim arguably points to a
rather high baseline level of scrutiny by international
courts, which in turn implies that these courts do not
leave considerable discretion to the contracting states.
The overarching concern with the effective enjoyment
of fundamental rights has influenced the development
in the framework of international conventions on human
rights of sui generis interpretation principles, more par-
ticularly the teleological and the evolutive interpretation
principle.10 While the former implies a consideration of
the underlying ratio of rights, the evolutive or dynamic
interpretation of human rights reflects that these rights
are not static. The latter characteristic of fundamental
rights is nicely captured in the ECtHR’s living instru-
ment doctrine, following which ‘the European conven-
tion is a living instrument … [that] should be interpre-
ted in the light of “present day conditions”’.11
It may be obvious that different opinions can and do
exist not only about the most decisive interpretation
principle but also on what ‘effective enjoyment’, ‘telos’,
etc. mean and imply. The ensuing different interpreta-
tions also reflect different visions about the role of inter-
national courts and the appropriateness of judicial acti-
vism. While different interpretations of the law can be
defended, ultimately a choice needs to be made by the
adjudicator.12 Admittedly this choice is subjective to
some extent.13 Nevertheless, the generally recognised
maxim that limitations to fundamental rights need to be
interpreted restrictively has already been argued to
point to the appropriateness of a rather high level of
scrutiny as baseline. The latter, in turn, implies a strong
case for judicial activism, for the appropriateness of a
rather ‘active’ court, in the sense of one that does not
easily ‘follow’ the arguments of the states. Furthermore,
given the generally recognised importance of the max-
ims of legal certainty and predictability for the rule of
law, it is arguably important that courts adopt explicit
and transparent reasoning regarding the interpretation
they adopt.14 This explicit reasoning can, in turn, con-
tribute to a certain sense of objectivity.
1.2 Human Rights, Interpretation, Limitations,
and Multi-Disciplinary Legal Research
Multi-disciplinary legal research investigates the extent
to which non-legal disciplines can function as auxiliary
disciplines to guide the interpretation of the legal norms
10. Inter alia Letsas, 2007, Chapter 3 in particular.
11. ECtHR 25 April 1978, 5856/72 (Tyrer v. The United Kingdom), para.
183.
12. See also J. Pauwelyn and M. Elsig, ‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation:
Variations and Explanations across International Tribunals’, in J.L. Dun-
off and M.A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Interna-
tional Law and International Relations, CUP (2012), at 445-69; M.
Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a
Context of Constitutional Pluralism’, EJLS, at 3 (2007).
13. Inter alia Poiares Maduro, 2007, at 3; R.H. Fallon, ‘A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation’, Harvard Law
Review, at 1223 and 1247 (1987).
14. See also D.L. Faigman, ‘Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitu-
tional Adjudication’, 88 Northwestern University Law Review, at 642-3
(1993-1994).
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and thus ‘fill in’ the legal framework.15 An article on
multi-disciplinary legal research inevitably explores
whether these interpretation principles for human rights
also imply openings to other disciplines. Teleological
interpretation, and its reflection on the ratio of norms,
invites input from moral and political philosophy and,
depending on the concept, also other disciplines such as
psychology. The evolutive or dynamic interpretation of
human rights, and the need to take into account changes
in society, calls for a consideration of sociological theo-
ries and data. In other words, the input of these other
disciplines can be argued to be necessary for the proper
(doctrinal) analysis of human rights, in relation to both
the determination of the scope of application of human
rights, and the limitation analysis.
A central requirement for a limitation to a fundamental
right to be legitimate is that the limitation is proportion-
ate to the legitimate aim invoked by the state.16 This
proportionality requirement depends, following the
Court’s steady jurisprudence, on all relevant circum-
stances of the case. In other words, complying with the
proportionality requirement is intrinsically related to a
balancing of all relevant interests, according to each
interest’s relative weight. Proper balancing is essential
for the effective protection of fundamental rights by
international courts, and arguably requires that the
respective weight of all relevant interests is considered
and discussed.17 Put differently, only when all relevant
interests are taken into consideration and given their
appropriate weight can the legal standards be correctly
applied.
Arguably, identifying all relevant interests, as well as the
relevant variables – determining the relative weight of
the interests concerned – cannot be realised with a pure-
ly legal perspective. Especially in complex cases, the
perspectives of non-legal disciplines, and particularly
social sciences and political philosophy, provide addi-
tional insights and information about the interests in
play, including historical and collective dimensions
thereof. Indeed, confirming the preceding argumenta-
tion concerning interpretation principles, human rights
is a field of law which almost per se requires input from
non-legal disciplines in order to obtain the doctrinally
15. S. Taekema and B. Van Klink, ‘On the Border: Limits and Possibilities of
Interdisciplinary Research’, in B. Van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law
and Method, Mohr Siebeck (2011), at 11.
16. In principle one has to have regard to the formulation of each right and
the stipulations of its limitation clause. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence
of the supervisory organs reveals that the proportionality requirement is
key.
17. See infra on the argument that ‘proper balancing’ also requires a critical
review of the justifications put forward by the state. The level of scruti-
ny adopted by the courts is in any event important for the effective pro-
tection of fundamental rights.
correct application of the law.18 Not surprisingly, legal
doctrinal research on human rights increasingly turns to
non-legal disciplines, as auxiliary disciplines to guide
the interpretation of the legal norms.
Exploratory research shows that such multi-disciplinary
research is especially called for concerning the funda-
mental rights of persons belonging to (ethnic, religious,
and linguistic) minorities. The effective protection of
rights, hinted at above, is particularly important for per-
sons belonging to minorities, given their vulnerable
position.19 However, and notwithstanding the princi-
pled commitment of liberal democracies, the rights of
persons belonging to ethnic, religious, and linguistic
minorities tend to present a challenge for public author-
ities in light of other policy concerns, including pursu-
ing ‘an integrated society’, tackling economic crises, and
terrorism threats.20 As the problem analysis below will
confirm, courts confronted with cases on minorities’
rights encounter difficulties in identifying and weighing
all relevant interests concerned. These cases are often
complex, not only in terms of the range of different
interests in play, but also in terms of the historical and
collective layers of these interests. Systemic discrimina-
tion against a group deeply affects a society’s structure,
with discrimination in the field of education, entailing
discrimination in the employment sphere and so on.
Traditional, ingrained dominance of particular groups,
and/or prolonged periods of discrimination against oth-
ers, in turn, implies that the status quo reflects the
majority norm. Disproportionate impact on minority
groups of the related apparently neutral rules is not
always detected by (international) courts.21 Hence –
returning to the central research question of this article
– it merits investigating in what way the findings of
non-legal research can be incorporated in legal doctrinal
research, and feed into judicial practice, so as to
improve the identification and weighing of all relevant
interests for the analysis of minorities’ rights.
The analysis of this article proceeds in three sections.
Section 2 discusses the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
concerning minorities and argues that the Court in sev-
eral respects reduces cases and fails to properly balance
18. K. de Feyter, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Social Sciences’, in F. Coo-
mans et al. (eds.), Methods of Human Rights Research, Intersentia
(2009), at 218, 231. See also the argument from Vranken restated by
Elaine Mak in her contribution to this issue, emphasising that interdisci-
plinary insights are required when arguments with an empirical conno-
tation play a role in legal reasoning (Elaine Mak, ‘Watch Out for the
Under Toad: The Challenge of Contextualisation in Comparative Legal
Analysis’, [5]). The examples given, such as arguments concerning rea-
sonable and context-oriented interpretation, and effective legal protec-
tion play a central role in human rights reasoning (see also infra).
19. A.S. Akermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in International
Law, Martinus Nijhoff (1997), at 23-8; K. Henrard and R. Dunbar
(eds.), Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International
Law Perspectives, CUP (2008), introduction; R. Medda-Windischer, Old
and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion, Nomos
(2008), introduction.
20. Inter alia R. Rubio-Marin, ‘Integration in Immigrant Europe: Human
Rights at a Crossroads’, in R. Rubio-Marin (ed.), Human Rights and
Immigration, OUP (2014), at 73-5.
21. See below for further elaboration, also through the discussion of partic-
ular cases.
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all relevant interests and variables. Two major causes
are identified for these jurisprudential flaws, namely
lack of knowledge and concerns about its own political
legitimacy. This article focuses on multi-disciplinary
legal research as a means to tackle the lack of knowledge
of the ECtHR (and other international courts). Further-
more, it is anticipated that when the Court would
address the lack of knowledge by relying on non-legal
disciplines, this could possibly have indirect beneficial
effects for its concerns about its political legitimacy.
Section 3 focuses on ways in which multi-disciplinary
legal research could tackle the lack of knowledge and the
related uncertainty regarding the identification of all rel-
evant interests and variables for the analysis of minori-
ties’ rights. It discusses how and in what ways the find-
ings of non-legal disciplines can enrich the analysis of
minorities’ rights, and what disciplines could function
as ‘auxiliary disciplines’. Section 4 goes on to discuss
how the findings of non-legal disciplines could feed into
the judicial practice of the ECtHR and other interna-
tional courts in a way which alleviates concerns for its
own political legitimacy.
In other words, in this article multi-disciplinary legal
research is discussed as a means to address both causes
of the current flaws in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on
minorities, the lack of knowledge, and the concerns
about its own political legitimacy. More generally, inter-
national courts’ use of data of non-legal disciplines will
not only contribute to the identification and proper
weighing of all relevant interests in cases on minorities’
rights, but their explicit and transparent reasoning could
also bring objectivity and predictability to judicial deci-
sion making, and indirectly address legitimacy concerns.
2 ECtHR Case Law: A Problem
Analysis
Turning to the European Court of Human Rights, this
Court is increasingly confronted with cases on (ethnic
and religious) minorities that trigger heated debates
throughout Europe. Admittedly, the text of the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights does not include
rights for (persons belonging to) minorities. Neverthe-
less, the teleological and evolutive interpretation princi-
ples used by the ECtHR clearly carry potential to
address specific minority concerns pertaining to their
separate identity (and substantive equality). In terms of
the scope of application of rights, the Court’s willing-
ness to do so and to interpret the scope of rights gener-
ously is visible in several jurisprudential lines.22 For
22. Note thought the Court’s restraint in relation to language rights that
pertain to communications with the public authorities: K. Henrard,
Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual
Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination,
Kluwer (2000), at 125-28; an analysis confirmed in L. Peroni, ‘Erasing
Q, W and X, Erasing Cultural Differences’ in E. Brems (ed.), Diversity
and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECtHR, CUP
(2013), at 445-68.
example, the Court easily recognises that the wearing of
the headscarf is a manifestation of one’s religion and
thus covered by the freedom of religion. Similarly, the
Court’s acknowledgement that respect for a traditional
way of life is a component part of the right to privacy is
beneficial for ethnic minorities. However, a different
picture emerges when assessing the Court’s limitation
analysis. The following critical assessment focuses on
the Court’s reasoning in its analysis of limitations to
these fundamental rights.
Notwithstanding its overall outstanding reputation,23 it
has been noted – also by other academics – that the
ECtHR’s jurisprudence on minorities and their rights is
flawed because it does not identify and weigh all rele-
vant interests in the limitation analysis, thus often inap-
propriately ‘reducing’ cases regarding minorities.24 The
Court can be argued not to take ‘all relevant circumstan-
ces’ into account, as it proclaims to do. More particular-
ly, the Court in several respects fails to acknowledge the
various layers and the group-character of disadvantage
and discrimination suffered by minorities. Consequent-
ly, when balancing the respective interests, the Court
does not accord sufficient weight to the interests on the
minorities’ side. Insights from social sciences and politi-
cal philosophy would arguably help ‘complete’ the pic-
ture, and enable the Court to identify all relevant inter-
ests and variables. As will be demonstrated in the more
in-depth analysis below, this ‘reduction’ of cases by the
Court is visible in several cases on Roma, the paradig-
matic example in Europe of a group who has been the
victim of prolonged systemic discrimination. Similarly,
in cases regarding religious minorities, the Court can be
seen to often disregard structural advantages of majori-
ties, related to the extent to which the dominant reli-
gion’s values are ingrained in society, thus glossing over
the related disadvantages of religious minorities.25
Prior to the discussion of a selection of judgements that
provides paradigmatic examples of the flaws in the
ECtHR’s jurisprudence,26 the parameters for a critical
analysis of the Court’s case law are set out. In order to
explain the criticisms regarding the Court’s analysis, we
need to return to the doctrine of legitimate limitations
and more particularly the central requirement that limi-
23. Inter alia A. Timmer, ‘Towards an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the
European Court of Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, at 708
(2011). See also H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The
Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, OUP (2008).
24. The term ‘redux’ was used explicitly in the (title of) Julie Ringelheim’s
article on the ECtHR’s Chapman case (J. Ringelheim, ‘Chapman Redux:
The European Court of Human Rights and Roma Traditional Lifestyle’,
in E. Brems (ed.), Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting
Judgments of the ECtHR, CUP (2013), at 426-44). Similar ideas were
already visible in earlier writings, Inter alia by Olivier de Schutter, Sia
Spiliopoulou Akermark, and Kristin Henrard, and when focused on reli-
gious rights Javier Martinez Torron and Lucy Vickers.
25. P.G. Danchin, ‘Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of
Human Rights’, Michigan Journal of International Law, at 693 (2011);
J. Martinez-Torron, ‘Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law
on the European Court of Human Rights’, Emory International Law
Review, at 607 (2005).
26. It is indeed beyond the scope of this article to conduct a comprehensive
analysis of the relevant case law of the ECtHR.
114
ELR December 2015 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000046
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 500266
tations need to be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued by the state, and the related balancing of the
respective interests.27 As acknowledged above, different
opinions about the role of international courts translate
in different stances about the appropriateness of judicial
review. Nevertheless, the basic tenets of the human
rights paradigm, more particularly the maxim that limi-
tations need to be interpreted restrictively, point
towards the appropriateness of a rather high baseline
level of scrutiny by international courts when evaluating
the proportionality requirement.28 Arguably, the
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation doctrine invites a criti-
cal assessment in this respect. As will be developed in
Section 4 of this article, a turn to the multi-disciplinary
legal perspective could, over time, also have beneficial
effects on the Court’s concerns about its political legiti-
macy, underlying the use of the margin of appreciation
doctrine.
It is first of all important to clarify that this doctrine
concerns one form of state discretion in relation to fun-
damental rights among several others.29 Several of those
forms of discretion are not at all problematic but simply
reflect the nature of human rights. One form of discre-
tion flows from the fact that human rights’ standards are
not set at the level of the best possible protection, but
rather denote a bottom line, a minimum that needs to be
realised. Obviously, there are many degrees of realisa-
tion above that bottom line, and the choice states make
in this respect falls fully within their discretion. The
choice of means/methods to reach the bottom line is
similarly a matter of acceptable state discretion.30 How-
ever, the margin of appreciation doctrine as developed
by the Court concerns the demarcation of the bottom
line in a particular case, more particularly the question
whether a particular limitation is proportionate to the
legitimate aim invoked.
While in some respects the ideas underlying the margin
of appreciation seem sound and acceptable, in the end
leaving states a margin of appreciation sits uneasily with
adopting a serious level of scrutiny by way of baseline,
as argued above. Indeed, the bottom line is case specific,
and depends each time on all relevant circumstances.
National authorities can be said to be better placed to
make this case-specific assessment as they are ‘closer’ to
their societies. In this respect, the margin of apprecia-
tion is said to reflect that international courts are subsid-
iary to the national authorities, who bear the primary
responsibility to respect fundamental rights (in their
27. Kumm, 2009, at 3; T.A. Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing’, Yale Law Journal, at 943 (1987); Christoffersen, 2009, at
107-8; J.H. Gerards, Belangenafweging bij rechterlijke toetsing aan
fundamentele rechten, Kluwer (2006), at 7-26.
28. Henrard, 2012a, at 372, 388 ff.
29. J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity Review’, Cambridge
Law Journal, at 191-201 (2006).
30. See also state obligations in relation to the implementation of EU direc-
tives.
jurisdiction).31 Nevertheless, the fact that states have the
primary responsibility to respect human rights does not
guarantee that they also do so. Indeed, the assumption is
challenged on a daily basis by accounts of human rights’
violations in the contracting states. Hence, it is essential
that the system of international supervision actually
assesses whether the national authorities have respected
‘the bottom line’. This would confirm the appropriate-
ness of a rather high level of scrutiny by way of baseline.
However, the margin of appreciation is inversely related
to the level of scrutiny (review) adopted by the Court.
Hence, the wider the margin left to states, the lower the
level of scrutiny adopted by the Court. Put differently,
the more generous the Court is in the margin it leaves
states, the less likely that the level of scrutiny it adopts
will attain the baseline level advocated here. Further-
more, when states ratify the Convention, they accept
that the European Court has the competence to review
their actions and inactions for compliance with the Con-
vention, and has the final word in this respect.32 Grant-
ing states a margin of appreciation concerning the ‘bot-
tom line’ appears to downgrade the international super-
vision system set up by the Convention.
Returning to the argumentation about ‘proper balanc-
ing’, this baseline level of scrutiny is also intrinsically
related to – to some extent implicit in – ‘proper balanc-
ing’. ‘Proper balancing’ arguably implies meticulous
balancing: all relevant interests and variables should be
suitably identified and appropriately weighed.33 When
setting out to identify all relevant interests and variables
for the proper analysis of minorities’ fundamental
rights,34 the two overarching concerns of minority pro-
tection, namely (substantive) equality and the right to (a
separate) identity, are a logical starting point.35 The
right to equal treatment36 concerns both a right to sub-
stantive or real equality and an effective protection
against invidious discrimination, which shields against
disadvantageous treatment for which there is no reason-
able and objective justification. An effective protection
against invidious discrimination is an essential precondi-
tion for a proper treatment of persons belonging to
minorities. Substantive equality builds on this, and goes
further in that it may require differential treatment so as
31. Inter alia P.G. Carozzo, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law’, AJIL, at 69 (2003); Letsas, 2007, at 83; P.
Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Rela-
tivism?’, Human Rights Law Journal, at 3 (1998).
32. Articles 19, 32, and 46 (in relation to Article 1) ECHR.
33. Kumm, 2009, at 3-4; Henrard, 2012a, at 370-3.
34. See inter alia R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, OUP (2002),
at 178, 184, 192. This problem analysis focuses on the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR. However, minorities are entitled not only to general funda-
mental rights (as in ECHR) but also to minority specific rights (as in the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities –
FCNM): K. Henrard, ‘The Added Value of the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities: The Two Pillars of an Ade-
quate System of Minority Protection Revisited’, in Verstichel et al.
(eds.), The Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument?, Intersentia (2008), at
91-3.
35. Henrard, 2008, at 92; Medda-Windischer, 2008, at 96-7.
36. For an extensive analysis see Henrard, 2007.
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to do justice to the specificities of the case. In so far as
this differential treatment aims to take into account
(accommodate) the specific identity characteristics of
minorities, substantive equality is actually interlinked
with the right to identity. The latter implies a prohibi-
tion of forced assimilation.37 Fundamental rights that
contribute to the realisation of the right to identity
include rights that protect the minorities’ own way of
life, the expression of one’s separate identity, and its
maintenance (through education). Of course, everything
depends on the interpretation of these rights and the
balancing of the respective interests in case of limita-
tions to these rights.38
2.1 A Selection of ECtHR Judgments Pertaining
to Minorities – Paradigmatic Examples of
Flawed Balancing
The following examples of cases on systemic discrimi-
nation of ethnic minorities and on claims for accommo-
dation by religious minorities explain and clarify how
the Court can be and has been seen to ‘reduce’ cases
concerning minorities.39 Throughout the analysis, the
flaws in the Court’s jurisprudence will be related to the
major causes hinted at above, namely lack of knowledge
and concerns about the Court’s political legitimacy,
while clarifying the role of the margin of appreciation
doctrine. The possible improvement of the Court’s rea-
soning through the use of non-legal disciplines will be
hinted at as well.
It is generally recognised that Roma suffer systemic dis-
crimination. The Court, however, often does not give
due weight to the decades of neglect and discrimination
that this group had to endure, the groups’ special needs
in relation to its separate, own way of life, and at times
even a case-specific background of racist incidents.40
The related ‘reduction’ of the cases is visible in cases on
police violence against Roma, and Roma evictions from
37. Y.M. Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, Intersentia
(2002), at 3, 8, 41-2; Henrard and Dunbar, 2008, at 11-4; A. Xanthaki,
‘Multiculturalism and International Law: Discussing Universal Stan-
dards’, Human Rights Quarterly, at 24 (2010).
38. Donders, 2002, at 329-34; Henrard, 2008, especially at 101-4.
39. See also E. Brems (ed.), Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewrit-
ing Judgments of the ECHR, CUP (2013), chapters 7, 8, 9, 16, and 17.
Similar mechanisms are at play in cases involving linguistic minorities:
Henrard and Dunbar, 2008, throughout the chapters as one of the syn-
ergies studied, see p. 14.
40. O. de Schutter, ‘Le droit au mode de vie tsigane devant la Cour europé-
enne des droits de l’homme: droits culturels, droits des minorités, dis-
crimination positive, note sous CEDH Buckley c. Royaume-Uni arrêt du
25 septembre 1996’, Revue Trimestrielle de droits de l’homme, at 81
(1997); K. Henrard, ‘The Council of Europe at the Rescue of a Paradig-
matic Case of Failed Integration. About Roma, the Multidimensional
Nature of Integration, and How Promising General Principles Can Meet
Flawed Applications in Practice’, European Yearbook on Minority
Issues, at 271-316 (2010-2011) [de facto out in 2013. they are indeed
running behind in terms of years] (throughout the article, conclusion p.
316).
caravans and townships because of the illegality of the
accommodation.41
In cases of alleged discriminatory violence by police
officers against Roma, the Court is strikingly reticent in
the sharing of the burden of proof. In EU law (and gen-
eral non-discrimination law), a special allocation of the
burden of proof for discrimination cases42 has been
developed: because it is virtually impossible to prove
discriminatory intent, the claimant only needs to prove
facts that allow a presumption of discrimination to arise,
making a prima facie case. The government then needs
to prove that no discrimination took place. The ECtHR,
however, has been most reticent in accepting a prima
facie case which would shift the burden of proof to the
government.43 Arguably the Court does not take all rele-
vant circumstances into account, thus reducing the case,
when it discounts – in the allocation of the burden of
proof – the broader context of decades of police abuse in
particular countries/regions, even when this is com-
bined with racial slur uttered by policemen. Findings of
non-legal disciplines, particularly social sciences, could
point to the relevance of the broader contextual infor-
mation when deciding whether or not a presumption of
discrimination is made out.
A second line of cases on Roma, which point towards
the Court’s ‘reduction’ of the cases regarding minorities,
concerns evictions from caravans and townships because
of the illegality of the residence.44 Several cases concern
Roma living in caravans on plots of land that are –
according to general land planning rules – not allowed
41. Inter alia Henrard, 2013, at 303, 308, 310. A third line of cases con-
cerns Roma’s relegation to separate and sub-standard education (in
several Eastern European states). Notwithstanding the striking overre-
presentation of Roma children in schools/classes for children with men-
tal disabilities, the Court for a long time ignored this disproportionate
impact of at first sight neutral rules on a vulnerable minority group. The
related disregard by the Court for questions of overall impact on effec-
tive and actual access to a right (education) constituted another form of
‘reduction’ of the related cases. In the meantime, the Court seems to
have firmly incorporated indirect discrimination in its non-discrimination
jurisprudence and, in a range of cases, goes rather far in acknowledging
the systemic nature of the misdiagnosis of Roma children, and the dan-
ger of cultural bias in the tests used. Nevertheless, it can still be ques-
tioned whether the Court attaches proper weight to all interests in play
when it classifies the problem as one of indirect discrimination and not
of direct discrimination. Indeed, when public authorities hold in place a
system of which is known that it disadvantages Roma pupils, would this
not reflect an intent to maintain the system and thus disadvantage
Roma? See also M. Davidovic and P.R. Rodriguez, ‘Roma Maken
School in Straatsburg’, 34 NJCM Bulletin, at 155-72 (2009).
42. Inter alia M. Ambrus, Enforcement Mechanisms of the Racial Equality
Directive and Minority Protection: Theory and Four Case Studies, Elev-
en International Publishing (2011), at 27-30.
43. ECtHR (GC), Nachova e.a. v. Bulgaria, 6 July 2005. For references to
other similar cases, see the ECtHR’s Factsheet on Roma and Travellers
(www. echr. coe. int). The recent case on a religious minority with a simi-
lar history of systemic discrimination, Begheluri e.a. v. Georgia, 7 Octo-
ber 2014, seems to denote a certain relaxation in establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination.
44. The Yordanova case (ECtHR, 24 April 2012) concerns the expulsion of
Roma from a township of self-made shacks and the destruction of these
shacks against a background of racist incidents. Strikingly the Court
glosses over the latter background and focuses on the legitimate aim of
safeguarding safety and security in relation to housing, without howev-
er acknowledging the possibility of a mixed motive, namely also one of
racial discriminations (based on deep-seated prejudice against Roma).
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for habitation, while there are too few official caravan
sites to cater for the Roma. The Court does acknowl-
edge the interest of Roma to lead an own way of life.
However, in all these cases, the Court easily allows gen-
eral planning policy considerations of the state to out-
weigh the Roma’s interest, granting states a broad mar-
gin of appreciation in the matter.45 In other words, the
Court does not seem to (want to) be aware of the severe
ramifications for Roma of these hurdles in terms of
accommodation, and the broader ramifications it has for
their physical and psychological well-being and for their
integration in society. In this case, the lack of knowledge
is most likely compounded by concerns about the
Court’s legitimacy when it would curtail states’ freedom
to develop their own policy in light of local circumstan-
ces. Indeed, the European consensus about the need to
improve the situation of Roma (visible in numerous
documents of the EU, Council of Europe, and the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) has not yet translated in a common policy in
terms of caravans and caravan sites.
Similarly, in cases concerning religious minorities, the
Court disregards structural advantages enjoyed by the
majority, related to the extent to which the dominant
religion’s values and symbols are ingrained in society.
Consequently, it glosses over the ensuing disadvantages
of religious minorities.46 A striking example of this type
of ‘reduction’ is visible in the Lautsi case in which the
Grand Chamber holds that a crucifix in a public school
class room is merely a passive symbol: this reasoning
arguably ‘reduces’ the interests of pupils not to be inap-
propriately exposed to the symbols of one religion to the
exclusion of all others.47 More generally, the Court has a
steady line of jurisprudence granting states a wide mar-
gin of appreciation in relation to the way in which they
organise ‘church-state relations’.48 The grant of a wide
margin to states in the broad range of religious matters
covered by ‘church-state relations’, reflects the Court’s
weariness to impinge on an area that is since the middle
45. Inter alia ECtHr [GC] 18 Januari 2001, 27238/95 (Chapman v. The
United Kingdom); ECtHR, Winterstein e.a v. France, 17 oktober 2013.
46. J. Temperman, ‘State Neutrality in Public School of Education: An Anal-
ysis of the Interplay Between the Neutrality Principle, the Right to Ade-
quate Education, Children’s Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief,
Parental Liberties, and the Position of Teachers’, Human Rights Quar-
terly, at 885-6, 893-4 (2010); L. Zucca, ‘Lautsi: A Commentary on a
Decision by the ECtHR Grand Chamber’, International Journal of Con-
stitutional Law, at 218-29 (2013).
47. See also J. Temperman (ed.), The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary
Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public Classroom, Martinus
Nijhoff (2012), particularly the chapters in part V.
48. For a more detailed analysis which demonstrates that in certain religious
matters the Court de facto is narrowing the margin of appreciation it
leaves states: see K. Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human
Rights’ Concern Regarding European Consensus Tempers the Effective
Protection of Freedom of Religion’, Oxford Journal on Law and Reli-
gion, at 23 (2015).
ages considered to be a core aspect of state sovereign-
ty.49
The preceding overview of case law and related analysis
reveals that ‘discrimination’ themes tend to play an
overarching role in cases on minorities. As was highligh-
ted above, discrimination complaints by minorities are
often complex, due to the systemic and structural nature
of the discrimination concerned. The invidious discrim-
ination is always related to their separate identity and
ensuing prejudices. Protection against this type of dis-
crimination would thus indirectly also protect their right
to identity. In so far as the differential treatment aims at
protecting or promoting minorities’ separate identity,
the goal of substantive equality also contributes directly
to minorities’ right to identity.50
Unfortunately, precisely in cases on ethnic, religious,
and linguistic minorities, the ECtHR seems to avoid
non-discrimination analysis as much as possible,51 par-
ticularly when it ultimately concerns requests for suita-
bly adapted measures and policies.52 It may be that com-
plaints of minorities often pertain to complex situations,
but this complexity actually requires a well-considered
development of the non-discrimination analysis, rather
than avoidance. The proper identification and weighing
of all relevant interests and variables in the rights analy-
sis, where necessary having regard to social sciences and
political philosophy, is equally essential here. Further-
more, avoiding non-discrimination analysis stifles the
consistent and coherent development of non-discrimi-
nation law.
Similarly, in relation to minorities’ right to identity, the
Court has not moved beyond the general recognition
that states have a duty to facilitate the minority way of
life, and take minorities’ separate identity into account
when devising and implementing laws.53 The Court has
indeed been reluctant to identify concrete state obliga-
tions in this respect, presumably also because it is
uncertain on how to identify and quantify all the rele-
vant interests involved.54 Similar concerns play in rela-
49. In the middle ages this understanding was captured in the latin adagium
‘cujus regio, ejus religio’. See also K. Henrard, The Ambiguous Relation-
ship between Religious Minorities and Fundamental (Minority) Rights,
The Hague, Eleven (2011), at 20-4. The Lautsi case clearly demonstra-
ted the strong concern about the Court’s political legitimacy that under-
lies the Court’s grant of a wide margin of appreciation to states regard-
ing the way in which they organise ‘church-state relations’. The Grand
Chamber reversed the finding of a violation by the Chamber following a
public outcry and interventions by thirty three parties in the Grand
Chamber proceedings.
50. This needs to be related to the two overarching concerns of minority
protection, being the right to equal treatment and the right to identity:
see above.
51. L. Claridge, ‘Protocol 12 and Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na: A Missed Opportunity?’, European Human Rights Law Review, at
82-6 (2011); J. Maher, ‘Eweida and Others, a New Era for Article 9?’,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, at 216 (2014).
52. Henrard and Dunbar, 2008, at 351-52; Ringelheim, 2013, at 427.
53. ECtHR, Chapman, para. 96. See also Henrard, 2012a, at 379-80; Ring-
elheim, 2013, at 431-3.
54. de Schutter, 1997, at 82-3. This uncertainty is at times reflected in con-
tradictory judgements and reasoning in particular cases between Cham-
ber and Grand Chamber as in the Lautsi v. Italy judgement, discussed
below.
117
Kristin Henrard doi: 10.5553/ELR.000046 - ELR December 2015 | No. 3
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 500266
tion to the recognition of cultural, religious, and linguis-
tic dimensions to effective access to education, and pub-
lic (health care) services.55
These examples show the ECtHR discounting the pro-
longed and group nature of discrimination against
minorities, not properly acknowledging the full range of
relevant interests on the side of minorities, and the
myriad and often accumulated layers of disadvantage
that they are confronted with. This lack of proper iden-
tification and weighing of the relevant interests and var-
iables compromises the effective protection of minori-
ties’ fundamental rights.56 Furthermore, the related
superficial reasoning by the Court implies that no guid-
ance is given to the contracting states for their policy
development.57 In the preceding analysis, the existing
flaws in the ECtHR’s analysis of minorities’ fundamen-
tal rights have been argued to stem from a combination
of two major causes: lack of knowledge on the one hand
and concerns about the Court’s own political legitimacy
on the other. To some extent, the flaws in the Court’s
reasoning can be explained by a lack of knowledge about
all the relevant parameters that influence the respective
weights of minorities’ interests. To some extent, the
Court might prefer (choose) not to get too deep into
these often controversial matters. This ‘preference’ ties
in with more overarching concerns that the Court might
jeopardise its political legitimacy when it would pro-
nounce itself on cases that are intertwined with con-
tracting states’ perceptions of national identity and/or
of conceptions about state sovereignty in relation to the
place of religion in society.58
The preceding analysis of the ECtHR case law has also
hinted at the way in which the Court seems to navigate
its lack of knowledge and concerns about its political
legitimacy through the application of the margin of
appreciation doctrine; more particularly, by granting
states in several cases pertaining to minorities a broad
margin of appreciation.59 The Court has indeed clarified
that the breadth of the margin of appreciation is not
55. K. Henrard, ‘Minorities, Identity, Socio-Economic Participation and Inte-
gration: About Interrelations and Synergies’, in K. Henrard (ed.), The
Interrelation Between the Right to Identity of Minorities and Their
Socio-Economic Participation, Brill (2012c), at 56-8, 60-2.
56. A. Farahat, ‘The Exclusiveness of Inclusion on the Boundaries of Human
Rights in Protecting Transnational and Second Generation Migrants,
European Journal of Integration and Law, at 254 (2009); Henrard,
2012a, at 372-3.
57. A similar lack of guidance is visible when the Court grants states a
broad margin of appreciation and does not actually analyses the case,
nor engage in a weighing of the respective interests: Henrard, 2012a, at
372-3; J. Kratochvil, ‘The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the
European Court of Human Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human
Rights, at 330, 332 (2011).
58. Similar uncertainty exists for public authorities, this time in confronta-
tion with national backlashes against minority-tailored rights and poli-
cies. Rubio-Marin, 2014, at 90-3; S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf (eds.),
The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Prac-
tices, Routledge (2011), at 1-31.
59. Y. Arai-Takahashi, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Theoretical
Analysis of Strasbourg’s Variable Geometry’, in A. Follesdal, B. Peters &
G. Ulfstein (eds.), Constituting Europe: The ECtHR in a National, Euro-
pean and Global Context, CUP (2013), at 96-7; Brems, 2013, chapters
7, 8, 9, 16, and 17; Henrard, in Foblets, 2012, at 59-86.
always equally broad, while identifying several relevant
factors.60 Two of these factors merit further discussion
as they tend to lead to unsatisfactory results for persons
belonging to minorities, due to the particularly wide
margin of appreciation granted to states. Firstly, the
Court often uses the factor of the European consensus,
referring to a consensus among European states.61 A
high level of European consensus entails a narrow mar-
gin of appreciation for states, while a lack of consensus
widens the margin considerably.62 Whereas the former
seems perfectly justifiable, the latter is not at all obvi-
ous. The absence of European consensus could also be
considered to invite guidance by the Court, instead of
leaving the matter (almost) entirely to the contracting
states themselves.63 Since policies concerning minorities
tend to concern complex, and often controversial mat-
ters, it will come as no surprise that little consensus can
be detected. Consequently, states are invariably granted
a particularly wide margin of appreciation.64 Secondly,
the Court tends to leave states also a very broad margin
of appreciation concerning general policy choices.
Again, minorities are often strongly affected by general
policy choices, such as planning regulations (housing)
and curriculum content (education). Leaving states a
broad margin of appreciation in these matters tends to
mean that the Court formulates little or no evaluation,
and does not even seem to try to identify all relevant
interests, let alone weigh them. In other words, the
Court more or less ‘hides behind’ the broad margin it
leaves states.
In the end, Court’s use of the margin of appreciation
doctrine enables it to avoid taking a stance on many
complex and mostly controversial minority questions.
Without advocating that the judiciary should disrespect
the separation of powers and take the place of the execu-
tive/legislator, it remains the task of the ECtHR to
supervise that states respect their human rights obliga-
tions under the ECHR in the development of their poli-
cies and practices. Whereas the lack of knowledge as
such could in theory also induce the Court to adopt a
more ‘searching’ level of scrutiny, the combination with
the concern about political legitimacy seems to tilt the
Court towards the ‘safer’, more prudent route of not
evaluating at all, or at least less. Leaving states a broad
margin of appreciation in cases concerning minorities
means that the Court virtually abdicates its own super-
visory role and leaves the matter largely to the states
concerned.65 This, in turn, tends to entail a protection
of the status quo and the existing dominance of the
60. However, these factors are not used in a consistent, let alone systematic
way: Kratochvil, 2011, at 345-7; Mahoney, 1998, at 3.
61. D. Shelton, ‘Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law?’, Human Rights Law
Journal, at 4-11 (2006).
62. Inter alia Kratochvil, 2011, at 329-30.
63. Inter alia Henrard, 2012a, at 374-5.
64. Henrard, 2012a, at 376-80; Ringelheim, 2013, at 440.
65. N. Bratza, ‘Living Instrument or Dead Letter – The Future of the ECHR’,
European Human Rights Law Review, at 116-28 (2014); Henrard,
2012a, at 371.
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majority.66 Leaving this broad margin to states also
implies that the Court does not provide guidance to the
state parties on how to analyse cases on minorities’
rights and balance the respective interests. In both
respects, the effective protection of minorities’ rights is
compromised.67
3 Lack of Knowledge to
Identify and Weigh All
Relevant Interests and
Variables Pertaining to
Minorities and Their Rights:
A Turn to Multi-Disciplinary
Legal Research
The selection of cases discussed above confirmed that
cases pertaining to minorities and their fundamental
rights are often complex. One of the important causes
for the flaws in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on
minorities, and more particularly the way in which the
Court reduces these cases, concerns the impossibility to
identify all relevant interests and variables with a purely
legal lens. Since the effective protection of minorities’
rights depends on proper balancing of all the relevant
interests and variables, it merits exploring what non-
legal disciplines can contribute in terms of additional
insights about these interests and their relative weight.68
This multi-disciplinary legal research would then ideal-
ly feed into judicial practice.69
This research has indeed not yet been fully conducted.
However, the preliminary research in relation to the
above cases has provided the first indications about what
disciplines could function well as auxiliary disciplines
for the analysis of minorities’ fundamental rights, more
particularly in light of the underlying complexities of
cases on minorities’ rights. Subsequently, some
thoughts are put forward on the way in which the data/
findings of the non-legal disciplines can be incorporated
in the legal (fundamental rights) frame.
The preceding analysis of the ECtHR’s case law criti-
cised the Court’s reduction of the cases, inter alia by not
66. Arai-Takahashi, 2013, at 96-7; S.E. Berry, ‘A Tale of Two Instruments:
Religious Minorities and the Council of Europe’s Rights Regime’, Neth-
erlands Quarterly of Human Rights, at 34 (2012); K. Henrard, ‘A Criti-
cal Appraisal of the Margin of Appreciation Left to States Pertaining to
‘Church-State Relations’ under the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR’, in M.C.
Foblets et al. (eds.), A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity and Accommo-
dation in the European Workplace, Ashgate (2012d), at 68-9.
67. M.R. Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights’, International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly, at 638-50 (1999). See also D. Xenos, ‘The Human Rights of the
Vulnerable’, International Journal of Human Rights, at 591-614 (2009).
68. See supra for broader usefulness of the findings of this project, namely
to guide the supervisory practice of international courts generally and
policy development of public authorities globally.
69. See infra in Sections 4 and 5.
sufficiently taking into account the group dimension of
disadvantage suffered by minorities and the layers of
disadvantage resulting from systemic discrimination.
Another line of criticism focused on the Court’s glossing
over the extent to which a particular religion has infused
the social fabric of a state, thus disadvantaging adher-
ents to other religions. Arguably, these various layers of
disadvantage that minorities experience are important
components of ‘all relevant circumstances’ the Court
says it needs to take into account when evaluating cases.
Indeed, these layers of disadvantage imply ever so many
barriers to effective enjoyment of rights, whereas the
effective enjoyment of rights is an overarching concern
of the ECtHR.
Non-legal disciplines that are particularly apt to unveil
relevant interests and layers of disadvantage that have
been missing so far from the Court’s analysis are politi-
cal philosophy and (empirical) social studies. The jus-
tice perspective in political philosophy uncovers, for
example, relevant (group-related) interests for the rights
analysis.70 In terms of relevant variables, the philosophi-
cal and sociological (social science) perspectives bring to
the fore and highlight (inter alia) the group dimension
of the disadvantage suffered,71 the accumulation of vari-
ous layers of disadvantage, and also the systemic nature
of disadvantage and discrimination.72 These additional
interests and/or variables that determine the relative
weight of an interest all refine one way or the other the
quantification of disadvantage (damage) suffered.
Similarly, the attention for the interrelation between
various integration dimensions in social sciences allows
to identify and quantify additional layers of disadvant-
age (harm) suffered by the members of the minority
concerned. Indeed, several integration dimensions have
been distinguished in social sciences, which all relate
and interrelate for full integration:73 structural integra-
tion, social integration, cultural integration, and identi-
ficational integration. Structural integration is undoubt-
edly most relevant in terms of law and rights as it con-
cerns rights, status, and (non-discriminatory) access to
the labour market and core institutions in society. Nev-
ertheless, sociological theories emphasise the interrela-
tion with the other integration dimensions. Hence, hav-
70. See inter alia J.H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Con-
textual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness, OUP (2000); B. Par-
ekh, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdepend-
ent World, Palgrave Macmillan (2008).
71. Inter alia W. Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalization of Minority Rights’,
International Journal of Constitutional Law, at 4 (2008).
72. J. Apap, ‘The Relationship Between Integration and Citizenship’, in S.
Carrera (ed.), The Nexus between Immigration, Integration and Citi-
zenship in the EU. CHALLENGE Collective Conference Paper, April
2006: <http:// www. ceps. be, 13>; A. Favell, The Europeanisation of
Immigration Politics, European Integration Online Papers (1998); R.
Koopmans, I. Michalowski & S. Waibel, ‘Citizenship Rights for Immi-
grants: National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in
Western Europe, 1980-2008’, American Journal of Sociology, at
1202-1245 (2012).
73. Inter alia F. Heckmann et al., Effectiveness of National Integration
Strategies towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative
European Perspective, EFFNATIS Final Report to the EU Commission,
Bamberg 2001.
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ing regard to these other integration dimensions and the
related disadvantages suffered there by persons belong-
ing to minorities are important to identify layers of dis-
advantage that have been neglected in the human rights
analysis so far. More particularly, discrimination in
terms of structural integration has considerable negative
repercussion for the other integration dimensions as
well. When one is de facto excluded from access to qual-
ity education, as was visible in a range of Roma cases
before the ECtHR, one is not only barred from higher
education and thus the better jobs, but one also has less
chances to interact with members of other social groups.
Lack of social contacts hampers social integration and,
in turn, inhibits mutual behavioural and attitudinal
adaptations, while flawed structural, social, and cultural
integration hinders the emergence of a sense of belong-
ing and commitment (identificational integration). This
more extensive and explicit consideration of layers of
disadvantage, and their interaction and mutual rein-
forcement, arguably invites a reassessment of the weight
of the respective interests concerned.
A more general reason why it is important to have
regard to social science integration studies for a more
comprehensive identification of relevant interests and
variables for the analysis of minorities’ fundamental
rights is that striking parallels exist between the ‘target’
groups of integration and fundamental rights of (per-
sons belonging to) minorities.74 Integration (goals) evi-
dently concern population groups that are different
from the majority or the dominant groups in society.75
Hence, integration concerns seem to be targeted at
minorities in the broad sense of the word, encompassing
traditional minorities and indigenous peoples as well as
new or immigrant minorities.76 Relatedly, the search for
the optimal balance between unity and diversity is
equally key in relation to integration as to minority poli-
cies.77 Furthermore, a preliminary investigation reveals
74. M. Pentikainen, ‘Integration of Minorities into Society: How It Is Reflec-
ted in International Documents and in the Work of ECRI and the Advi-
sory Committee of the Framework Convention’, in M. Scheinin and R.
Toivanen (eds.), Rethinking Non-discrimination and Minority Rights,
Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University (2004), at 97-133.
75. K. Henrard, ‘The Intractable Relationship Between the Concepts “Inte-
gration” and “Multiculturalism”: About Conceptual Fluidity (Substan-
tive) Context Specificness and Fundamental Rights Perspectives’, in M.
Podunavac (ed.), The Challenges of Multiculturalism; the South-East-
ern European Perspectives in the European Discourse, Heinrich Böll
Foundation (2013), at 107-24; Henrard, 2011, at 338.
76. Inter alia G. Alfredsson, ‘Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and
Peoples: Definitions of Terms as a Matter of International Law’, in N.
Ghanea and A. Xanthaki (eds.), The Minorities, Peoples and Self-Deter-
mination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry, Martinus Nijhoff
(2004), at 169; W. Kymlicka, ‘Beyond the Indigenous/Minority Dichot-
omy’, in St. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Hart (2011), at 187-8; R.
Penninx, D. Spencer & N. van Hear, Migration and Integration in
Europe: The State of Research, Oxford (2008). See also K. Henrard,
‘Tracing Visions on Integration and/of Minorities: An Analysis of the
Supervisory Practice of the FCNM’, International Community Law
Review, at 338-9 (2011) (special issue).
77. Inter alia T. Hadden, ‘Integration and Separation: Legal and Political
Choices in Implementing Minority Rights’, in N. Ghanea and A. Xantha-
ki (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Martinus Nijhoff
(2005), at 174-7.
that at least some of the foundational values for integra-
tion and fundamental rights overlap,78 namely equality
and participation. Actually, the recent and much deba-
ted judgement of the ECtHR in SAS v. France (1 July
2014) shows the pressing need for the Court to incorpo-
rate the integration perspective in a more principled
manner in its jurisprudence. Indeed, the abrupt way in
which the Court introduced ‘living together’ and the
underlying integration argument as decisive arguments
in its rights analysis triggered several critical remarks.
The introduction of the integration argument was not
only not explained, it furthermore did not do justice to
the complexities involved.79
When exploring the further question how multi-disci-
plinary research can feed in the analysis of minorities’
fundamental rights, it should be highlighted that, as
Theunis Roux nicely formulates in his article for this
special issue: the incorporation of non-legal disciplines
into doctrinal research necessarily occurs on laws’
terms.80 In other words, the standard for incorporation
is an internal legal standard: the translation and incorpo-
ration of other disciplines is geared towards the coherent
development and improvement of legal doctrine.81 Mul-
ti-disciplinary legal research for the analysis of minori-
ties’ rights specifically aims to enrich and improve this
analysis by identifying additional relevant interests for
this analysis, as well as relevant parameters. This
implies that the non-legal disciplines ‘feed’ into the
human rights paradigm, and more particularly human
rights doctrines concerning interpretation principles,
legitimate limitations, the proportionality principle, bal-
ancing of interests, and also the margin of appreciation
doctrine.82 Put differently, these other disciplines would
not be decisive, hence it does not matter so much that
within these non-legal disciplines there are differences
of opinion about the relevance of particular interests
and/or variables. The different disciplines considered in
this respect may highlight different interests and/or dif-
ferent variables, but these differences are not something
that compromises the usefulness of multi-disciplinary
legal research, rather to the contrary. Indeed, the find-
ings of these non-legal disciplines are merely used to
point to the possible relevance of additional interests,
and to obtain insights about possibly relevant variables
that otherwise would be overlooked. In the end, in so far
as this multi-disciplinary legal research would feed into
judicial practice, courts would still (have to) consider all
78. Ch.R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, OUP (2011); G. Engbersen,
‘Spheres of Integration: Towards a Differentiated and Reflexive Ethnic
Minority Policy’, in R. Sackmann, B. Peters & Th. Faist (eds.), Identity
and Integration: Migrants in Western Europe, Ashgate (2003), at
59-76. See also Hadden, 2005, at 180.
79. E. Brems, ‘S.A.S. v. France as a Problematic Precedent’, blog 9 July
2014, <http:// strasbourgobservers. com/ 2014/ 07/ 09/ s -a -s -v -france -as -
a -problematic -precedent/>.
80. Th. Roux, ‘The Incorporation Problem in Interdisciplinary Legal
Research: Some Conceptual Issues and a Practical Illustration’, [7].
81. See also B. Van Klink and S. Taekema, ‘Limits and Possibilities of Inter-
disciplinary Research into Law: A Comparison of Pragmatist and Positi-
vist Views’, [Repub.eur.nl], at 12.
82. For the possible ‘impact’ over time on the use of the margin of appreci-
ation doctrine, see also under 4 below.
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relevant circumstances of the case before them, and
decide what factors and variables to consider in the con-
crete case before them. In other words, the legal frame-
work remains key in framing the analysis, the non-legal
disciplines are ‘merely’ considered to expand the range
of interests and variables that can be relied upon, ulti-
mately by courts, for the analysis of minorities’ rights.
Overall, the preceding analysis has arguably demonstra-
ted that further (multi-disciplinary legal) research is
warranted about the way in which non-legal findings
and theories about layers of disadvantage encountered
by minorities, also in terms of the various integration
dimensions, can be translated into (additional) interests
and variables relevant for the analysis of minorities’
rights.83
4 Influencing the Practice of
the ECtHR and International
Courts More Generally:
From Knowledge to
‘Courage’?
This more developed multi-disciplinary legal research
could subsequently feed into judicial practice, in the
sense that (international) courts generally could consult
the resulting more complete overviews of potentially
relevant interests and variables. One cannot expect
courts, judges, to do themselves all the multi-disciplina-
ry legal research, but they might be willing to draw on
the findings of such research conducted by academia.84
The courts would then decide case by case which inter-
ests and variables to include in their legal assessment
and reasoning, in light of the special circumstances of
each case. In other words, courts’ in concreto weighing
would remain, but they could draw on a ‘richer’, more
complete, toolkit. To the extent that courts would have
doubts about the way in which the findings of non-legal
disciplines would need to be weighed, they could draw
on the assistance of experts (in these disciplines) as is
already the practice in a number of fields.
As was acknowledged before, courts’ interpretation of
the law and analysis essentially involves making a choice
from a variety of plausible alternatives. Arguably, the
ECtHR and other international courts would only use
the multi-disciplinary legal research findings, in so far
as they would be willing to review (the case and the
83. J. Friedrichs and W. Jagodzinski, ‘Theorien Socialer Integration’, Kolner
Zeitschrift fur Sociologie und Socialpsychologie (1999); Henrard, 2013,
at 107-24.
84. See also infra on the US Supreme Court judgement in Brown v. Board
of Education (347 U.S. 483 (1954) which has been hailed for its for
fuelling an increasing multidisciplinary law: Inter alia M. Heise, ‘Brown
v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity’, 90 Cornell
Law Review, at 307-8 (2005). At the same time the judgement was
criticised for relying on one particular study whose methodology gave
rise to substantial technical criticism (Ibid., at 294-5).
respective interests) seriously and adopt a rather search-
ing level of scrutiny. Courts may be concerned about
their political legitimacy when adopting these higher
levels of scrutiny, leaving less discretion to the contract-
ing states. Nevertheless, it is opined that when courts
can rely on multi-disciplinary legal research which
allows them to chart the quantum of the disadvantage
suffered by vulnerable minority groups in a more com-
prehensive manner, these courts may actually be swayed
to do so. International human rights courts’ readiness to
do so is not unlikely especially in view of the potential
contribution to the effective protection of minorities’
fundamental rights, which remains their overarching
concern after all.
This is exactly what is argued to lay behind the US
Supreme Court reliance on social sciences in its seminal
judgement in Brown v. Board of Education that under-
scored that segregation itself meant inequality.85
Furthermore, it may very well be that expanding inter-
national courts’ explicit reasoning, and attempting to
tackle lack of knowledge outright by relying on multi-
disciplinary legal research, would actually enhance their
legitimacy and also states willingness to comply. Indeed,
while there is always a question of choice and thus sub-
jectivity in the way in which a court would use the mul-
ti-disciplinary legal research findings, making this
choice explicit and arguing it in light of ‘all relevant cir-
cumstances of the case’ arguably objectivises the court’s
reasoning. Ultimately, when courts makes this choice,
and the related reasoning, explicit, a body of jurispru-
dence can emerge, that bring still more ‘objectivity’ to
the balancing.86 In this respect, the ECtHR might feel
gradually more confident and ‘courageous’ to have less
recourse to a broad margin of appreciation for states,
while also other international courts adjudicating on
fundamental rights might find the ‘courage’ to reduce
the amount of discretion they leave states.
5 Conclusions
This article sets out to contribute to this special issue
devoted to multi-disciplinary legal research by discus-
sing first the limits of purely doctrinal legal research in
relation to a particular topic, and second the relevant
considerations in devising research that (inter alia)
draws on non-legal, auxiliary disciplines to ‘fill in’ and
85. J.M. Wisdom, ‘Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the
Judicial Decision-Making Process in School Desegregation Cases’, 39
Law and Contemporary Problems, at 138, 142 (1975), underscoring
that ‘the social science evidence was the kind of support a court likes to
find in a record to lend factual and scientific aura to a result … dictated
by the moral necessity of changing social attitudes’.
86. This phenomenon of ‘objectivisation’ is already visible in highly sensitive
and controversial instances of conflicting rights of, for example, the
right to respect for privacy and the freedom of expression: see inter alia
K. Henrard, ‘Botsende grondrechten en het EHRM: een pleidooi voor
meer zorgvuldige argumentatie en minder “margin of appreciation”
voor staten’, in E. Brems, R. de Lange & K. Henrard (eds.), Botsing van
Grondrechten, BJU 2008, 29-61.
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guide the legal framework. The topic concerned is the
(analysis of the) fundamental rights of minorities.
The introduction highlights the generally acknowledged
truth that law, also human rights law, is open to multi-
ple plausible interpretations. Courts, when adjudicating,
need to make a choice what interpretation to adopt. This
choice depends on the interpretation principles relied
upon and also on the position taken in relation to the
role of courts, and the degree of activism that would be
appropriate. Relying on foundational principles of fun-
damental rights, the case is made for human rights
courts to adopt a rather activist approach, adopting a
baseline level of scrutiny which is rather high. Further-
more, while acknowledging the inherently subjective
nature of the interpretation of fundamental rights, it is
opined that when courts would develop extensive
explicit reasoning, this would facilitate the emergence of
lines of jurisprudence, and thus predictability and a cer-
tain objectivity.
The article starts maybe somewhat a-characteristically
with a critical assessment of the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights regarding the analy-
sis of minorities’ rights, more particularly the failure to
properly identify and weigh all relevant interests and
variables and the related reduction of minorities’ cases
its analysis operates. This ‘prelude’ is necessary because
it provides crucial insights in the causes of these alleged
flaws in the Court’s jurisprudence: lack of knowledge
(about the relevant interests and variables for the analy-
sis of minorities’ rights) and concerns with the Court’s
political legitimacy. At the same time the critical analy-
sis of the Court’s jurisprudence allows already for the
identification of possible contributions from findings
from sociology (related social sciences) and political phi-
losophy. The article goes on to argue for the need for
further multi-disciplinary legal research, drawing on
social sciences and political philosophy as auxiliary dis-
ciplines that could ultimately assist courts in tackling
the lack of knowledge when analysing minorities’ rights.
Subsequently, these researches (findings) could feed
into judicial practice, possibly with the help of experts.
The ECtHR and other international human rights
courts are not unlikely to draw on this multi-disciplina-
ry legal research when it would enable them to really
take into account ‘all relevant circumstances’ of the case
before them and thus identify and properly weigh all
relevant interests in cases on minorities’ rights. In addi-
tion to the significant contribution to the effective pro-
tection of fundamental rights, the courts’ ensuing
explicit and transparent reasoning will over time crystal-
lise into lines of jurisprudence, thus bringing further
objectivity and predictability to judicial decision mak-
ing.
Furthermore, the ensuing more explicit reasoning by
international courts will offer better guidance to public
authorities, ending their often disturbing uncertainty,
thus making them more ‘at ease’ when ruling on minori-
ties’ rights, knowing that they can justify the choices
made in light of a broad panoply of relevant interests
and variables. This in turn might further contribute to a
positive cooperation between contracting states and
international courts, and thus reduce the latter’s (per-
ceived) legitimacy problems.
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